Principle Without Persuasion: South Africa’s Foreign Policy Dilemma

This article forms Part II of a series examining why South Africa’s constitutional order is  frequently misread by the United States and its allies. It responds to renewed criticism during Donald Trump’s presidency and recent diplomatic signals, including South Africa’s exclusion from a US-hosted G20 engagement, by situating South Africa’s foreign-policy choices within constitutional and international legal frameworks. 

South Africa is often described as a country that sits on the fence. 

When it refuses automatic alignment with powerful states, the criticism is familiar: indecision,  moral ambiguity, quiet hostility. That accusation sharpened after South Africa condemned  United States action in Venezuela and called for an urgent meeting of the United Nations  Security Council. In Washington, this was widely interpreted as an unfriendly act. 

This article is not a defence of outcomes, but an analysis of constitutional method. 

What is often described as neutrality is, in reality, constitutional non-alignment. Yet South  Africa has failed to explain this clearly, consistently, and persuasively. 

“What looks like neutrality is often constitutional restraint, poorly communicated.” Non-Alignment Is a Constitutional Obligation 

South Africa’s Constitution does not permit foreign policy to operate outside law. External  relations are expected to reflect the same values that govern domestic power: dignity,  accountability, and restraint. This was a deliberate post-apartheid choice, grounded in the  recognition that unchecked power had caused harm both internally and externally. 

Klug (2010) asserts that South Africa’s constitutional design deliberately integrates  international law into domestic constitutional reasoning. A state that limits power at home  cannot exercise it freely abroad. 

The Constitutional Court affirmed this approach early on. In S v Makwanyane, it held that  international human-rights law is not optional background material but a legitimate  interpretive guide to constitutional meaning. Liebenberg (2010) situates this within South  Africa’s project of transformative constitutionalism, in which law is intended to reshape how  power is exercised rather than merely restrain excess. 

That logic was reinforced in Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa, where the  Court held that international anti-corruption obligations shape constitutional duties  domestically. As Dugard (2018) explains, the judgment confirms that international  commitments cannot be invoked selectively when politically convenient.

The implication is unavoidable. South Africa cannot align reflexively with any power bloc. It  must justify its foreign policy choices against constitutional and international legal principle.  Non-alignment is not preference. It is obligation. 

Why This Is So Often Misread 

The United States approaches foreign policy through a different constitutional culture.  Executive discretion in external affairs is wide, and courts have historically been reluctant to  intervene. As Koh (1990) shows, American constitutional practice has long treated foreign  policy as a political domain rather than one governed primarily by legal constraint. 

That difference matters. 

When South Africa insists on legal process and multilateral engagement, Washington may see  obstruction where South Africa sees constitutional compliance. Under Donald Trump’s  renewed presidency, foreign policy has again been framed in transactional terms, reinforcing  what Posner (2014) identifies as a shift from rule-based to power-based engagement. 

South Africa’s refusal to fall into line is therefore read as defiance. 

“Constitutional independence is misread as disloyalty in a transactional world.”

This misreading is real. So too is South Africa’s failure to correct it effectively. Venezuela and the Limits of Silence 

The Venezuela episode exposed this weakness. 

After reports of unilateral action against Venezuela’s leadership, South Africa condemned the  act, cited international legal principles, and called for Security Council engagement. DIRCO  explained that questions involving force and sovereignty must be addressed through  multilateral institutions rather than unilateral assertion. 

This position was legally correct. As Hurd (2017) explains, recourse to multilateral institutions  is not about choosing sides but about asserting legitimacy through law. 

Yet legality alone did not carry the message. South Africa did not explain repeatedly and  publicly why this response flowed from constitutional obligation, nor how it related to earlier  crises. Silence was mistaken for selectivity. 

“South Africa chose the rules but failed to explain why they mattered.” The Consistency Critique Cannot Be Dismissed 

The most damaging criticism concerns inconsistency.

South Africa called for UN engagement in response to United States action, but did not pursue  equivalent Security Council process after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This tension cannot be  brushed aside. Both states are permanent members of the Security Council. The explanation  cannot rest on veto politics alone. 

The distinction lies in legal framing. In Ukraine, South Africa prioritised de-escalation in a  conflict already defined by militarisation and bloc confrontation. In Venezuela, the concern  was whether unilateral action risked being normalised as lawful enforcement. 

As Crawford (2019) explained, international law does not require identical procedural  responses to every breach. It requires coherence of reasoning and purpose. 

Yet South Africa failed to articulate this distinction clearly and early. As Acharya (2014) warns us that norm-based foreign policy loses authority when principles are asserted without  sustained narrative clarity. 

Here, the failure was not constitutional. It was communicative. 

Power Has Not Disappeared 

Non-alignment does not shield South Africa from power. 

Retaliation remains possible. Influence is uneven. Alignment can appear safer in the short  term. But alignment does not eliminate risk. It relocates it. 

As Walt (2018) argues, middle powers often preserve autonomy more effectively through  predictable independence than unquestioned loyalty. Automatic alignment trades strategic  agency for temporary comfort. 

“Alignment buys silence today and vulnerability tomorrow.” 

What South Africa Must Now Do 

South Africa’s foreign-policy problem is no longer misunderstanding alone. It is institutional  failure to persuade. 

DIRCO has relied on technically correct but strategically thin explanations. Legal reasoning has  been episodic, reactive, and poorly connected across crises. Ambassadors have not been  consistently deployed as constitutional communicators. Constitutional reasoning has been  treated as self-evident rather than something that must be taught, defended, and repeated. 

This must change. 

South Africa needs a practice of proactive constitutional diplomacy. Each major foreign policy  position should be explicitly anchored to constitutional values and international legal  standards, with clear explanation of why similar principles may produce different procedural 

choices in different contexts. Norms only gain authority through repetition and  institutionalisation. Constitutional foreign policy is no exception. 

Therefore, South Africa’s dilemma is not a lack of principle. It is a failure of persuasion. 

Non-alignment remains constitutionally sound but, in a world, where power competes with  process, law must be communicated as carefully as it is applied. When explanation falters,  misunderstanding fills the gap and credibility erodes. 

This places responsibility squarely on South Africa itself. Constitutional foreign policy cannot  survive on silence, assumption, or episodic defence. It requires clarity, consistency, and  institutional discipline. 

“Principle without persuasion is no longer enough.” 

If South Africa wishes to remain a constitutional state in a multipolar order, it must treat  explanation as strategy. 

* Sherwyn Sean Cupido-Weaich is a legal and governance professional and researcher with an academic background in law and business. He holds a BA (Hons) in Business and Law (UK) and is completing an Executive MBA in Data Analytics (UK). He has published peer-reviewed research on economic justice and development and is currently engaged in  research at the intersection of constitutional governance, data, and public-sector transformation. 

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.