Can Angola overcome corruption to attract Western investment?

ANGOLA’S government has been working hard to court Western investors, but a fundamental problem continues to hold the country back: rampant corruption.

In late June, Angola hosted the US-Africa Business Summit in Luanda, hoping to showcase investment opportunities and strengthen ties with American and other Western businesses. The event brought together heads of state, ministers, and executives from both continents.

It was meant to signal that Angola is open for business beyond its traditional oil sector. However, behind the optimistic speeches and networking, a deep scepticism lingers among Western investors, who have seen promising talks before but remain wary of putting their money into a system widely seen as opaque and corrupt.

Analysts and experts argue that Angola must “get its house in order” internally if it wants to regain the trust of Western investors. “Our business environment has discouraged foreign investors from investing in Angola,” according to Osvaldo Mboco, an Angolan analyst in international relations.

Mboco points out that despite Angola’s eagerness to attract capital, endemic corruption and legal insecurity continue to undermine investor confidence. In practical terms, contracts are hard to enforce, and the rules of the game can change without warning, a major red flag for any serious international investor.

According to Mboco, Angola will only fully benefit from high-profile events like the US-Africa summit if it can ensure solid legal guarantees for investments and demonstrate that contracts and property rights will be respected. In other words, Angola needs to clean up governance, enforce the rule of law, and stamp out graft — essentially, make a convincing break with the practices that have scared investors away.

Another expert, Crispin Senga, reinforces this assessment bluntly. “The Angolan economy is not in a position to attract foreign investment mainly due to corruption, which still reigns in the country,” Senga observes, also citing insecurity and poor communication channels as contributing factors.

Despite a change in leadership and repeated promises of reform in recent years, corruption still permeates many levels of business and government in Angola. This creates uncertainty for Western companies, which worry that deals might be derailed by bribery, favouritism, or sudden policy shifts.

Senga warns that Angola has been too focused on polishing its external image, for example, hosting summits, making international pledges, while neglecting the internal reforms needed at home. As he puts it, as long as Angola continues to prioritise projecting a good image abroad but lets its domestic reputation slide, “it will be difficult to achieve great results.”

Essentially, no amount of international public relations can substitute for real changes on the ground that investors can see and feel.

Indeed, Angola’s international image will ultimately only improve if its internal conditions do. Senga insists that the consolidation of Angola’s reputation globally “must be done internally first.”

The country needs to demonstrate that it has a friendly and stable business environment where foreign investors are welcome and protected. That means clear regulations, transparency in public deals, and visible punishment of corruption when it occurs.

Western investors, unlike some others, tend to have shareholders and compliance rules that prevent them from operating in highly corrupt environments — they face legal and moral pressure to avoid paying bribes or getting entangled in scandal. Many Western companies recall Angola’s past notoriety for corruption and want proof that those days are ending.

President João Lourenço, who took office in 2017, launched an anti-corruption drive and even went after some high-profile figures from the previous regime. Those moves initially raised hopes. However, progress has been mixed and slow, with critics saying much more needs to be done to reform the judiciary and ensure transparency.

In global rankings like Transparency International’s index, Angola still scores near the bottom, almost at the very end, though not literally the last, reinforcing the perception that graft remains a way of life. This lingering reputation means that even when Angolan officials invite Western investors with attractive offers, many stay on the sidelines waiting for concrete signs of change.

The contrast with non-Western investors is telling. Angola has long managed to draw investments and loans from countries like China, which often attach fewer governance conditions. Chinese-financed projects, roads, railways, and housing developments exchanged for oil have proliferated over the past two decades, even as Western private investment (outside the oil industry) largely stagnated.

But Western nations and institutions demand certain standards. As Crispin Senga notes, the United States and its allies have their own criteria in dealing with African partners, emphasising values such as democracy, human rights, good governance, free markets, and combating corruption.

In practice, this means US or European funding is more likely to flow to Angola if the Angolan government can demonstrate accountability and clean governance. It’s a different approach from the one Angola was used to during its years of easy oil-backed loans. Now, if Angola wants diversified investment in manufacturing, infrastructure, technology, and agriculture from Western companies, it must convince them that their money won’t vanish into shadowy patronage networks or be stymied by bureaucracy and graft.

A clear example of the gap between announcements and reality is the much-touted Lobito Corridor project. This major infrastructure initiative, a railway linking Angola’s Atlantic port of Lobito to the mineral-rich regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo and beyond, has been hailed as a flagship of US-Angola cooperation in Africa.

Western leaders often cite the Lobito Corridor as a model project that can boost regional trade and showcase high-standard investment. During the summit in Luanda, the corridor was highlighted as a cornerstone for economic integration, and it had been the subject of high-level attention even before that.

In late 2024, then US President Joe Biden visited the region and drew attention to the Lobito Corridor as a symbol of America’s commitment to African infrastructure. In April this year, a delegation of ambassadors from the US and Europe, led by American diplomat James Story, toured the corridor, underscoring international support.

On paper, the project has backing from the Group of 7 nations, the European Union, and the US. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the U.S. Export-Import Bank. It has been praised by visiting diplomats as a model of international cooperation and seemingly represents exactly the kind of big-ticket investment Angola desires from the West.

Yet, for all the fanfare, the dollars have been slow to arrive. The US DFC announced around $250 million in financing for the Lobito Corridor back in February 2024, and additional investments totalling $553m were earmarked to modernise the railway line and expand the port facilities.

As of mid-2025, however, not a single dollar of that promised funding has been disbursed. The Lobito Corridor project, while still moving forward, has had to rely on the resources of its concession consortium, known as LAR, and other interim financing. Despite Angolan participation in the project, the consortium itself is made up exclusively of European firms, which, for now, are effectively carrying the costs themselves.

They publicly downplay the delay in funding, expressing confidence that the pledged money will eventually come, but the holdup is noticeable. Each month that passes without the US development funds is a reminder that Western financing often comes with strings and scrutiny.

Before releasing money, agencies like the DFC typically conduct extensive due diligence, ensuring that procurement is clean and funds won’t be misused. The slow trickle of funds for Lobito may simply be bureaucratic, but it also symbolises Western caution: grand announcements will not automatically translate into cash until Angola proves it can meet the standards expected.

The Lobito Corridor case illustrates a broader pattern. Even when Western governments and companies see potential in Angola — whether due to its strategic location, natural resources, or market size — they proceed carefully and often conditionally. Angola’s officials have promoted the country’s potential in forums from Washington to Brussels, touting reforms and new investment laws.

But many in the international business community remain unconvinced that the climate on the ground has truly changed. Decades of entrenched corruption and closed-door deals cannot be reversed overnight, and Angola’s reforms to date, while notable, have yet to transform how business is done in a way that the average investor can tangibly experience.

Meanwhile, Angolan authorities sometimes express frustration that Western investors are not seizing opportunities quickly enough, especially as competitors from China, the Middle East, or elsewhere show up more readily. The difference often comes down to trust: Western investors need to trust that their capital will be safe and their ventures treated fairly. Right now, that trust is in short supply.

For Angola, the stakes are high. The country is emerging from a difficult period of low oil prices and a pandemic-induced economic slump, trying to diversify an economy that has long been heavily dependent on oil exports.

Western investment could bring in not just money but also expertise, technology, and jobs in sectors like manufacturing, agriculture, and renewables, helping Angola reduce its reliance on oil and create broader prosperity. The government in Luanda clearly recognises these benefits; that’s why it has been actively engaging with Western partners and hosting events like the US–Africa Business Summit.

Yet, as analysts have pointed out, good intentions and high-profile events will mean little unless Angola demonstrates real change. Corruption is not just a moral issue; it has a direct economic cost. Each instance of graft or nepotism can scare away a potential investor or derail a project that might have created jobs for Angolans.

Conversely, every concrete anti-corruption reform — such as enforcing transparent public tenders, empowering an independent judiciary, or protecting whistleblowers — sends a positive signal to investors that Angola is serious about doing business the right way.

In the end, Western investors will return to Angola only when they see evidence that their mistrust is no longer warranted. That means more than just promises; it means visible action and consistent enforcement of rules. Angola will need to continue and deepen the anti-corruption campaign started under Lourenço, ensuring it’s not just targeting political rivals but truly improving governance at all levels.

It will also need to strengthen institutions so that laws and contracts are upheld regardless of who is in power. The challenge is steep — undoing a reputation built over decades can take years of sustained effort. But the reward for success would be substantial: increased investment from the US, Europe, and other Western sources could help transform Angola’s economy and create a more stable future.

Until then, however, Western investors are likely to remain cautious. They will watch closely whether Angola truly “arranges its house” and curbs corruption, or whether old habits continue. Only by proving that it has turned the page can Angola begin to rebuild the trust that is essential for attracting Western investment on a large scale.

* Dr Manuel Godsin is a writer and researcher at the International Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. He obtained a doctorate in international relations and strategic affairs from the University of Bergen in Norway and a Master’s Degree in International Crisis Management from the University of Oslo.

** The views expressed do not reflect those of the Sunday Independent, Independent Media, or IOL.

Get the real story on the go: Follow the Sunday Independent on WhatsApp.