By Dr Neil Overy
In early June, 2024 an exchange took place between a member of an environmental organisation, Gabriel Claasen from Project 90 by 2030, and Eskom’s nuclear support manager Keith Featherstone, that should concern anyone interested in the long-term safety of Koeberg nuclear power station.
The exchange took place in Athlone, Cape Town, during a public hearing organised by the National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) on Eskom’s application to extend the life of Koeberg nuclear power station for another 20 years – known as Long-Term Operation (LTO).
After a presentation by Featherstone on the LTO, Klaasen asked for clarity as to why the question of whether Eskom would be installing a core catcher at Koeberg for the LTO was not addressed in the presentation.
A core catcher, which is made from thermally-resistant concrete ceramic is placed underneath a reactor and designed to prevent molten radioactive fuel burning through the bottom of the reactor and into the wider environment in the case of a core meltdown.
In France, core catchers are being installed in all French nuclear reactors during their respective LTO processes, including in nuclear reactors of the exact same design as Koeberg.
The French nuclear regulator Autorité de sûreté nucléaire states that the installation of core catchers is so vital to the long-term safety of nuclear power stations having their lives extended, that it is a non-negotiable condition of their LTO licensing. This is largely because of safety lessons learnt from the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear disasters.
Featherstone’s answer to this question revealed two concerning things:
∎ First, he observed that the question was of a “very technical nature”. Implicit in this response is the tired contention that only certain experts can understand the issues at play. While expert knowledge is of course vital to the safety of Koeberg, this kind of gatekeeping can lead to other voices who have substantive and legitimate concerns being ignored.
∎ Second, Featherstone argued that Eskom had proved to the NNR within the context of the current regulatory regime, that Koeberg was safe now and would be safe during its lifetime extension because of the LTO safety case that Eskom had presented to the NNR.
Featherstone stated, “It is up to the regulator to determine if the approach we are taking to managing the safety of the plant is acceptable or not… And that is why I say that it (a core catcher) is not part of the application that we are putting in here.”
Featherstone is entirely correct to note that the NNR should be setting the safety standards that Eskom should be adhering to. So logically we need to ask why is the NNR not insisting on a core catcher as a condition for Koeberg’s LTO licence approval?
This question is disturbing, because it gets to the heart of the current serious problems with the NNR which is underfunded, understaffed, and is not the independent regulatory authority that it claims to be.
For years, the NNR has been claiming in its annual reports that it is underfunded.
For example, at the end of 2022, it noted that it was working in “a constrained financial environment”.
A year later, its CEO noted that the NNR was financially “stable”, adding somewhat ominously, that it “is expected to operate as a going concern for the near future”.
Every year the NNR also reports that it is understaffed in critical areas. For example, its 2023 annual report notes, “the NNR experienced challenges in recruiting senior-level staff in specialised engineering fields due to the limited number of persons with nuclear-related experience”.
These two problems are deeply concerning because they compromise the ability of the NNR to properly undertake its critical mandate to ensure nuclear safety in South Africa.
Neither of these problems should exist because South Africa is a signatory to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Convention on Nuclear Safety which states that regulatory bodies must be provided with the necessary “competence and financial and human resources to fulfil (their) assigned responsibilities”.
The Convention on Nuclear Safety also states that there should be “an effective separation between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or organisation concerned with the promotion or utilisation of nuclear energy”.
This is not the case in South Africa, where the mineral resources (and previously energy) minister has exerted extraordinary power over the NNR, despite his department also being responsible for the promotion of nuclear power.
This obvious conflict of interest has been noted by the IAEA in 2011, and again in 2013, when the representative of the IAEA in South Africa – conducting a review of nuclear infrastructure – stated, “considering the minister of energy appoints the NNR board and the CEO, approves the NNR’s budget and promulgates regulations, the integrated nuclear infrastructure review team is of the opinion that the separation between the regulatory functions and promotional activities is not adequate”.
Despite this assertion, South Africa’s 9th annual report to the IAEA on the Convention on Nuclear Safety drawn up by the NNR, the then Department of Mineral Resources and Energy, and Eskom simply asserted that “the independent status of the NNR is adequately provided for”.
This assertion goes against both international practice as outlined by the IAEA and the European Union which notes in its “Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations” that “member states shall ensure that the competent regulatory authority is functionally separate from any other body or organisation concerned with the promotion or utilisation of nuclear energy, including electricity production, in order to ensure effective independence from undue influence in its regulatory decision-making”.
Incidentally, the IAEA also asserts that regulators must be adequately funded and have the necessary skilled staff to be able to properly undertake their mandates.
Given the continual underfunding of the NNR, and the ongoing interference in its regulatory functioning by then energy minister, one is left to wonder which entity is making critical safety decisions during the LTO process at Koeberg?
Is it Eskom with the support of the (then) DMRE or the NNR as it should be? These questions are of critical importance because it may well be that decisions are being taken that compromise the long-term safety of Koeberg because alternatives, such as the retrofitting of a core catcher at Koeberg are considered too expensive by Eskom and the (then) DMRE within the context of both Eskom’s and the country’s ongoing debt crisis.
The recent decision by President Cyril Ramaphosa to remove the responsibility for the provision of energy from the DMRE into the new Ministry of Electricity and Energy provides an opportunity for the government to finally follow international best practices and ensure the “effective separation” of the regulator from those responsible for promoting nuclear power.
If long overdue steps are not taken to do so, the NNR will very likely remain underfunded and understaffed and it will remain unable or unwilling to make critical safety decisions that are in the best interests of all South Africans.
Dr Neil Overy is an environmental researcher, writer and photographer. He has worked in the non-profit sector for more than 20 years and is particularly interested in the intersection between environmental and social justice issues.
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